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A perhaps more important indirecteffect is
thatoflowerenergy prices on labor costs.
Cost-of-living-adjustment(COLA) clauses in
many existing labor contracts partially tie
wage increases to recent price changes.
Even where workers are notcovered by
We comparethe course ofenergycosts with
an indicatorofthe economy's strength by
comparing the index ofreal energy prices
with the level ofunemployment in Chart2.
The chart shows that large increases in the
unemploymentrate cameon the heels ofthe
steep rises in energy prices that occurred in
the 1970s. It is generally believed that the
large oil price increases were an important
cause ofthe subsequent increases in unem-
ploymentand in the rate ofinflation. The
question naturally arises, then, whetherthe
recent negative oil price shock will lower
unemploymentand inflation. .
lower inflation
Lowerenergy prices contribute directly and
indirectlyto lower inflation. Fullyone-third
ofthe twelve percentage point decline in
consumerprice inflation that occurred
between the late 1970sand the six-month
period ending February ofthis year is due
directly to lowerenergy prices because the
priceofenergy is a componentofthe
Consumer Price Index. This happened
despite the large increase in. natural gas
prices that accompanied theirderegulation.
The fall in energy prices also reduces the
cost ofproducing manyproducts and
thereby reduces inflation indirectly. These
reductions "percolate" through various
stages ofthe production process, finally
showing up in the cost offinished goods.
The effect on final prices is greatest for the
outputofindustries that are more energy-
intensive, such as chemicals and metals.
be positively associated with rises and falls
in real energy-price growth.
Fuel price declines
At its Winter conference, OPEC officially
agreed forthefirst timeto reducethepriceof
its Saudi marker crude oil. The five-dollar
reduction to twenty-nine dollars per barrel,
along with similarprice cuts in other cate-
gories ofOPEC oil, contrasts sharply with
the experienceofthe last decade when
posted oil prices rose dramatically. The solid
line in Chart 1 plots the percentage change
ofan index ofreal energy prices, that is, the
ratio ofenergy prices to the aggregate level
ofprices ofall goods and services. This
producer price index forfuel and power
includes the prices ofgasoline, heating
fuels, natural gas, and electricity.
The recent declines in energy prices will
have importanteffects on the economy. In
this Letter, their impacton output, inflation,
and interest rates will be addressed along
with their implications for monetary policy.
A decline in energy prices reduces the use-
fulness ofthe money supply and interest
rates as indicatorsoffuture ,Inflation and
output, but as we will show, itsimultane-
ouslyprovides monetary policywith awider
menu.ofmacroeconomic outcomes from
which to choose.
Chart 1also showsthe percentage change in
the aggregateprice level, as measured bythe
GNPdeflator. Rises and falls in this measure
ofinflation, especially in the 1970s, tend to
In thetwodecades before 1973,the frequent
negative values shown by the solid line
meant a decline in real energy prices of
nearly twenty percent. Relative energy
prices then reversed course, rising sharply
in the middle and again in the late 1970s.
Although the recent declines in energy
prices are not negligible, they pale in com-
parison to the increases brought about by
thequadruplingand subsequentdoublingof
oil prices associated with OPEC-1 in 1974
and OPEC-2 in 1979.
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COLAs, wage and salary negotiations often
take recent price increases into account.
Because labor costs constitute two-thirdsof
total production costs, the feedbackeffectof
lowerenergy costs onwage increases can be
important It can also occurfairly rapidly
since about halfofworkers covered by
COLAs in majoragreements have their
wages adjusted quarterly while mostofthe
other half, and most non-union workers,
have their wages adjusted annually.
A model ofthe economy developed by the
Department ofCommerce suggests that
wagegrowth slows byapproximatelyhalfas
much as the inflation rate after only one
year. Over the longer run, the model sug-
gests that wage growth slows by aboutthe
same amount as the inflation rate.Thus, a
pronounced oil price decline is capable of
having asizeable impacton wage growth,
And since wage growth is an important
determinant ofthe underlying, orcore,
inflation rate, oil price declines may lead
to lower inflation rates over the longer run
as well.
Higheroutput
Lower energy prices are likelyto strengthen
real demand by households, business, and
government Business will increase produc-
tion to satisfy increased real volumes of
sales, and, in the process, use moreofthe
economy's resources (including labor).
Eventually, itwill reduce unemployment
Households will spend less oftheir income
on foreign oiland have more lefttospend on
domestically produced 9utput Lower
energy prices will increase consumers' total
real spending power since wages and sala-
ries will often fall at a slower rate than
overall consumer prices in the near-term,
Over the longerterm, real wages will be
higher than othelWise because business will
have increased its use ofcapital and energy
in production and thereby enhanced labor
productivity,
Greater consumerdemand for business
products and lowerenergy costs will stimu-
2
late business investment in new plant and
equipment At the same time, real govern-
mentexpenditure is also likely to rise above
what was previously contemplated as the




for the economy, theymay alterthe short-
run relationship ofthe money supply to
prices and to output Monetary aggregates
areused bythe Federal Reserve as aguideto
monetary policy because oftheir relation to
income and spending, Large changes in oil
prices, however, may reducethe aggregates'
value to making monetary policy because
oil pricedeclinesmay lead to.lower.inflation""
and higher output than would othelWise
emerge even with nochange in money
growth or in the growth ofnominal income,
Unfortunately, changes in oil prices may
also reduce the value ofinterest rates as
economic indicators. Because nominal
interest rates consist ofa real rate and an
inflation premium, theirreactionto loweroil
prices mustbe studied in two parts, To the
extent that current inflation weighs heavily
in determining the inflation rate expected in
the nearfuture, slowing inflation will reduce
the inflation premium and thereby, nominal
rates. Lowerpriceswill also increasethereal
suppliesofmoneyand credit(at given nomi-
nal growth rates), and thereby put down-
ward pressure on real interest rates. The
decline in real rates, however, may be par-
tially offset by the effect ofincreased invest-
mentdirectly associated with lowerenergy
prices, A sufficiently strong investment
response means agreaterdemand for invest-
ment monies thatcould result in a higher
(than othelWise) real interest rate. In the
wake of loweroil prices, then, the net
change in real and nominal rates is
ambiguous,
Thus, even with unchanged money supply
growth, we may see either higher or lower
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Today, inflation may be more responsive to
oil shocks. The deregulation offinancial
institutions and the shorter length ofprivate
sectorlaborcontracts may havespeeded the
economy's responsiveness to shocks. With
the adventofnewfinancial instruments, real
asset returns are keptcloserto market levels.
Wages and the prices in deregulated indus-
tries such as transportation may now
respond morequickly.
These changes suggest that, in response to a
positivesupplyshocksuch as asharp dropin
energy prices, real wages may not rise as
much now as they fell during the 1970s. To
the extent that market rates were already
being earned on assets before the latest oil
price decline, real returns will probably not
rise nowthewaythey fell adecade ago. As a
result, such increased flexibility would
generate greater inflation reduction (and
largeroutputgain) than previousexperience
would have suggested.
In sum, the current shock offers the chance
to lowerthe underlying inflation rate. The
prospects for so doing may be even greater
with a drawn-out, moderate inflation reduc-
tion than with a sharp dropand subsequent
rebound. Ifso, temporarily faster money
growth maybe desirableboth because itwill
hasten theeconomy'srecovery and because
itwiII lessen the currentdownwardpressure
on inflation. Later, money growth must be















1970s. In the last decade, various factors
constrained the rise in inflation. Consumer
real demand was restrained by substantial
reductions inboth real wages and real finan-
cial wealth when oil prices rose in the early
1970s. Nominal wages responded slowly to
higher prices, and regulatory ceilings on
nominal interest rates effectively produced
negative real returns on important assets,
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Moreover, output may rise even ifmoney
growth slows moderately in response to the
lower oil prices. High real interest rates are
believed to have slowed the u.s. economy
over the past few years. However, while
some view the current high real rates to be
an impediment to vigorous recovery, the
recent energy price declines suggest that
recovery maystartwith historicallyhigh real
interest rates and continue with both output
and real rates rising. Ifinvestment rises due
to energy pricedeclines, rising rates may be
signalling stronger credit demand and not
only weak supplies.
Loweroil prices reduce the inflation rate
during the transition period marked by the
reverberation offalling prices throughout
the economy. Once a new price level is
attained, an inflation rate closer to the
underlying rate will be re-established. Infla-
tion at this core rate is largely determined
by growth in labor compensation and will
dominateoverthe intermediate-run, as itdid
between 1976 and 1978. In the shorter run,
consumer price inflation may fall dramatic-
allybecause energy costs and nominal inter-
est rates make up a large part ofconsump-
tion expenditures.
However, the economy's response to the
positive oil supply shock ofthe early 1980s
may not be asimple, scaled-down mirror
image ofthe negative shock ofthe early
higheroutput. Neither real nor nominal
interest rate movements alone would signal
the easing or tightening ofmonetary policy_
The movements also would not tell whether
future outputwill be higher or lower.
Monetary policy options
The sharp increase in energy prices in the
1970s presented monetary policymakers
with a fundamentally new policy problem:
Simultaneously rising inflation and unem-
. ployment. LoweroiI prices, as we have
shown, could mean lower inflation and
higher output than otherwise even ifmone-
tary policy remains unchanged.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
Selected Assets and Liabilities
largeCommercial Banks
ar r n
loans (gross, adjusted) and investments'" 162,856 - 260 2,958 1.8
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 141,346 - 107 2,238 1.6
Commercial and industrial 44,142 - 202 665 1.5
Real estate 56,200 39 - 1,123 - 2.0
. Loans to individuals 23,730 50 399 1.7
Securities loans 2,659 - 197 502 23.3
U,S. Treasury securities'" 8,257 42 1,726 26.4
Other securities'" 13,252 - 196 - 1,006 - 7.1
Demanddeposits - total# 44,138 3,024 4,124 10.3
Demanddeposits - adjusted 30,336 922 2,925 10.7
Savingsdeposits - totaH 67,191 - 382 36,290 117.4
Timedeposits - total# 64,274 - 113 - 31,139 - 32.6
IndiViduals, part. & corp. 58,148 48 - 27,560 - 32.2









Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings










* Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
t Includes MoneyMarket Deposit Accounts, Super-NOW accounts, and NOWaccounts.
Editorialcommentsmaybeaddressed totheeditor(Gregory Tong)ortotheauthor•...Freecopiesof
this and otherfederal Reserve publications canbe obtained by callingorwriting the Public Informa-
tionSection, Federal Reserve BankofSan francisco, P.O. Box 7702,San Francisco94120. Phone (415)
974-2246. .